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This paper uses diversity management as a placeholder for human rights policy. By diversity
management, I mean those policy techniques that a society can use to deal with diversity, which
include not only decisions to make diversity a subject of active legal and governmental interven-
tion, but also decisions to leave diversity to informal, unregulated choices by individuals or civil
society institutions. My discussion proceeds with particular reference to the United States, in part
because it has been relatively successful in managing its diversity in recent decades—relative, that
is, both to its own past (especially the pre-1965 period) and to the record of other countries today.
(Serious, long-standing problems in the integration of certain minorities in the U.S. remain, most
notably with respect to three groups: Native-Americans, “underclass” black men, and unskilled,
often undocumented, immigrants.)
An approach to diversity management “works,” in my view, if and to the extent that the country’s
vulnerable minorities (a) enjoy some social mobility, (b) are integrated into the major institutions
of society, (c) have access to political influence roughly proportional to their limited numbers, (d)
are free to live according to their own group values and practices, and (e) do not feel deep alien-
ation from the dominant cultural norms. By this definition, the American system works relatively
well—with the qualifications and exceptions noted just above. The paper proceeds in three parts.
Part I seeks to sharpen our understanding of diversity by analyzing several different ways of un-
derstanding and defining that idea, with a view to underscoring the significance of choosing one or
another measure of it. Part II discusses two examples— multiracial individuals and anti-profiling
laws—to illustrate the inevitable politicization of certain demographic categories when used for
politicallysensitive purposes. Part III presents some distinctive and, in some cases, unique features
of the American approach to diversity management. Most of these features, I argue, effectively
advance the cause of minority mobility and integration, whereas some tend to undermine these
goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Demography, as has often been noted, is destiny.  This is usually 
taken to mean that the trends of a society’s population over time—and 
more important, the changes with respect to the specific characteristics
of that population—have a great deal to do with the nature of that 
society.  This observation is almost tautological; after all, a society 
is defined, not just affected, by the specific attributes of those who
inhabit it.  
In saying that demography is destiny, we do not simply mean that 
it determines the number of the member in a given society.  Numbers 
are crucial, of course, not only because they affect almost every other 
aspect of society but also, most fundamentally, because its numbers 
(along with its fertility rate) determine whether it can remain viable 
as a society in the future.  (Russia is only the most obvious example 
of a nation that faces a genuine possibility of demographic extinction 
in the long run.)1  In addition to numbers, a population’s demographic 
characteristics help to shape its political behavior, cultural values, 
economic growth, structure and performance, fiscal resources, gender
relationships, crime rates, social services, and military capacity—
indeed, almost everything that matters to the well-being of its people. 
But there is another more interesting, less obvious, but highly 
consequential meaning to the familiar notion that demography is 
destiny.  Demography is neither self-defining nor pre-political.  A
society’s demography is simply the ensemble of variables that 
demographers choose (or are instructed by their superiors) to select, 
define, identify, classify, measure, and publish.  The choice of these
variables—and the ways in which people may analyze, combine, 
manipulate, interpret, and otherwise use them—profoundly influences
the society’s self-understanding, its conception of its problems, 
human resources, trajectory, achievements, and failures.  Grounded in 
1 See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. IB/96-2, 
POPULATION TRENDS IN RUSSIA (1997).
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social choices that often are as political and instrumental as they are 
technical, demography helps to mold the society’s beliefs about itself 
and the world.  In this way, these choices about how to think about 
demography shape its culture, politics, and public policies.      
What does this have to do with the struggle for human rights? 
Human rights, of course, is a notoriously ill-defined concept. 
(Indeed, that has been one of its most important rhetorical and 
political advantages).  The notion of rights is clear enough; they are 
entitlements to legal protection against certain denials of liberty.  As 
Sir Isaiah Berlin famously explained, liberty can be conceived of in a 
number of different ways, of which two are most pertinent: negative 
liberty (freedom from obstacles or constraints) and positive liberty 
(the freedom to act in a context that enables one to advance one’s life 
goals).2  Human rights, as noted, are more difficult to define, beyond
emphasizing their universality; they are rights to which individuals are 
entitled simply by virtue of their humanity.3  Their substantive content 
is governed by a growing body of international human rights law.4
In this paper, I focus on what I take to be the most fundamental 
aspect of any society’s approach to human rights: how it thinks about 
and manages its own diversity, with diversity being understood both in 
demographic and non-demographic terms.  By “diversity management,” 
I mean the repertoire of policy techniques that a society can use to deal 
with diversity.  By “dealing with diversity,” I mean not only decisions to 
make diversity a subject of active legal and governmental intervention, 
but also decisions to leave diversity to informal, unregulated choices 
by individuals or civil society institutions.  (Part I considers a range of 
these policy techniques.)  
2  Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty in, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (I. Berlin 
ed., 1969).
3  “Rights are supposed to exist in all times and all places: the enslavement of the 
Spartan helots and apartheid are what we would call human rights violations.”  Gary J. 
Bass, Everybody Everywhere, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 7, 2007, at 48 (review of LYNN 
HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY (2007)).
4  See, e.g., GERALD NEUMAN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS (1999).
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What is the relationship between human rights (whatever their 
substantive content) and diversity management, such that I can plausibly 
use diversity management as a placeholder for human rights policy? 
In earlier work, I have analyzed how different political-social theories 
of human flourishing—liberalism, utilitarianism, communitarianism,
and functionalism—conceive of and value (or disvalue) diversity.5 
Of these, liberalism captures most clearly the connections between 
human rights (conventionally understood in largely liberal terms) and 
diversity.  It is also the tradition with which I and most other Americans 
and (to a lesser but still considerable extent) members of other Western 
democracies identify.6
Competing versions of liberalism converge on the centrality of 
individual flourishing, the free and independent wills of all persons,
and their rights.  Most versions of liberalism regard diversity not as 
an independent or ultimate value but as a possible, or even a probable, 
consequence of individuals’ autonomous exercise of their wills 
and rights.  People who exercise this autonomy in order to advance 
their perceived interests are bound to make diverse choices and 
commitments, pursuing their ends with more or less success.  In so 
doing, they constitute their social identities and ways of life.  Liberal 
theorists disagree, of course, about the social, political, economic, and 
psychological conditions that must obtain before one can properly 
ascribe to individuals the genuine freedom of will that alone can 
legitimate their choices, and about the state’s role in establishing, 
altering, and interfering with these conditions.  Liberalism, then, finds
diversity not only congenial but also definitional or constitutive.  In
order for diversity to flourish, a liberal society must cultivate and
enforce a high degree of mutual respect and tolerance, of which 
the protection of human rights (properly understood) is a necessary 
5 PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 
55-72 (2003).
6 This is evidenced, among other indicia, by their constitutional jurisprudences, 
which increasingly protect individual rights against government deprivation.
4
Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Vol. 2 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol2/iss1/art5
DOI: 10.2202/1938-2545.1017
element.  So fundamental is this relationship that a country that fails 
to do so for its own inhabitants is most unlikely to respect the human 
rights of foreigners.   
My discussion proceeds with particular reference to the United 
States, not only because it is the society that I have studied most 
closely and thus know the best, but also because it has by most 
accounts7 been relatively successful in managing its diversity in recent 
decades—relative, that is, both to its own past (especially the pre-
1965 period) and to the record of other countries today.  To be clear, 
I do not claim that the American way of diversity management has 
succeeded entirely.  On the contrary, serious, long-standing problems 
in the integration of certain minorities in the U.S. remain, most notably 
with respect to three groups: Native-Americans, “underclass” black 
men,8 and unskilled, often undocumented, immigrants.9  
Nevertheless, we can learn a great deal from the American 
experience about what works in managing diversity—and also what 
doesn’t work.  An approach to diversity management “works,” in my 
view, if and to the extent that its vulnerable minorities—those whose 
members are most at risk of discrimination and powerlessness at the 
hands of majorities—are well integrated into the major institutions 
of society.  Integration, in this sense, is measured by the extent to 
which society assures them, at a minimum, four protections.  First, 
they must enjoy some social mobility.  They (and their children) must 
7  This includes my own.  SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 12-14.
8  The leading analyst of the differences in the integration of black men and black 
women in the U.S. is sociologist Orlando Patterson.  See PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF 
INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA’S ‘RACIAL’ CRISIS ch. 1 (1997) 
and Patterson, Black America, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE UNIQUE INSTITUTIONS 
AND DISTINCTIVE POLICIES THAT  HELP SHAPE THE WORLD (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. 
Wilson eds., forthcoming 2008).
9  Whether undocumented immigrants should be integrated into American society 
is a bitterly contested issue in the U.S.  See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Immigrants’ 
Political, Social, and Legal Incorporation in the United States after 9/11: Two Steps 
Forward, One Step Back, in IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND EUROPE (J. Hochschild & J. Mollenkopf eds., forthcoming).
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perceive that hard work, responsible behavior, and playing by the 
rules will be rewarded by progress to a higher standard of living and 
well-being over a reasonable period of time.  Second, they must have 
access to political opportunity and influence roughly proportional
to their limited numbers, voting activity, and willingness to enter 
alliances with others.  American blacks lacked this access until the 
implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 196510 but have gained 
it since then.  Third, they must be free to live according to their own 
group values and practices, except to the extent that those practices 
interfere with the equal rights of other groups.  In the U.S., Indian 
tribes, Hasidic Jews, and (at least recently) gays and lesbians enjoy 
this cultural autonomy.  Finally, they must not feel deep and chronic 
alienation from the dominant cultural norms, as distinguished from the 
kind of disappointments that minorities in a majoritarian democracy 
must often endure due to their smaller numbers.  
Each of these conditions is necessary if vulnerable individuals 
and groups are to be capable of defending their interests in the public 
domain.  If a society’s diversity management policies secure these 
conditions, then those policies will have done their important work. 
But beyond that minimal set of opportunities, a group’s success will 
depend on many other factors including the pull and haul of politics, 
its competitiveness with other groups, its members’ economic 
performance, the quality of its leadership, and the vitality of its 
culture.      
The paper proceeds in three parts.  Part I seeks to sharpen our 
understanding of diversity by analyzing several different ways of 
understanding and defining that idea, with a view to underscoring
the significance of choosing one or another measure of it.  Part II
discusses two examples—multiracial individuals and anti-profiling
laws—to illustrate the inevitable politicization of certain demographic 
categories when used for politically-sensitive purposes.  Part III 
10 Voting Right of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)).
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presents some distinctive and, in some cases, unique features of the 
American approach to diversity management.  Most of these features, 
I shall argue, effectively advance the cause of minority mobility and 
integration, whereas some tend to undermine these goals.
I. DEMOGRAPHIC AND NON-DEMOGRAPHIC
CONCEPTIONS OF DIVERSITY
Diversity, like most complex ideas, means different things to 
different people, so rendering the notion mutually intelligible is 
difficult.  Much depends on the level of generality at which one
discusses diversity and characterizes attributes and groups.  But 
because diversity is context-sensitive, it can also mean different things 
even to the same person at a single point in time.  Here, I explore a 
few different ways of understanding diversity by introducing certain 
analytical distinctions.  Some of them relate to the idea of diversity 
itself, while others relate to particular attributes (e.g., race, ethnicity) 
that a society may use to recognize, characterize, or measure diversity.  
Normative and descriptive diversity.  We often think about diversity 
normatively, assigning some personal or social value to it.  Although 
we likely harbor ambivalent or conflicting feelings about diversity, we
will formulate a positive or negative “on balance” assessment (at least 
if we care to have a view, which we often do not).  Officially, at least,
Americans, Canadians, and Indians apparently value diversity more 
highly than the Japanese and French do—even if the former are not 
very clear about what they mean by it.
We also sometimes think about diversity descriptively, simply 
observing differences among things or people without necessarily 
or consciously attaching any particular appraisal either to those 
differences.  Although I say we observe differences “simply,” our 
observations are anything but simple.  As discussed below, we do not 
yet clearly understand the cognitive processes through which we come 
to perceive things or people as being different (and hence remarkable), 
rather than as the same (and thus unremarkable or even unnoticed). 
7
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As a psychological, cultural, or esthetic matter, moreover, we may 
be incapable of observing difference simpliciter without at the same 
time rendering some value judgment about it.  Indeed, at a deeper 
epistemological level, we may say that differences among people do 
not really exist independently of the social meanings we impute to 
them.  
Individual and group diversity.  Individuals differ from one 
another in countless respects.  They also constitute themselves, or are 
constituted by others, into groups that differ from one another; indeed, 
this differentiation is what defines them as groups in the first place.
The number of such groups is vast, with the upper limit being the 
number of attributes individuals possess that they, or others, consider 
salient to their group identities or memberships.11  When we speak of 
diversity, therefore, we must be clear about whether we are speaking 
about diversity at the individual level or among groups.  
This clarity, however, may elude even the most scrupulous 
analysis.  Group definitions and boundaries are highly contested. 
Even if group boundaries were well-defined, their memberships
would overlap because individuals belong simultaneously to different 
groups, including ones they may not even recognize as such or wish 
to join.  Even within a particular, well-defined group, differences
among its members may be greater than those between its members 
and outsiders.  This fact may (or may not) call into doubt the utility of 
defining the former as a group for certain purposes, or at all.  In effect,
then, some efforts to recognize or increase diversity among individuals 
may reduce group diversity, and vice-versa.
We, of course, do not view our own attributes or those we ascribe 
to others as an undifferentiated bundle.  We imagine that some 
attributes are more central to our (and others) identities than other 
attributes are, that the former are more salient to how we think of 
11 I say upper limit because the costs of group formation and maintenance prevent 
some groups from forming or surviving despite the existence of common attributes 
that would otherwise suffice.  The classic account is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
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ourselves (or others), and that without them we (or others) would be 
very different people—or so we think.  The multiculturalism debate 
reveals much controversy on the empirical and normative issues 
surrounding individual and group identities both generally and in 
particular cases.  Indeed, the debates intensity reflects the widespread
recognition that our views about identity affect and are affected by 
public policies concerning education, affirmative action, citizenship,
and other multicultural issues.
Individual and group-cultural identities interact in complex 
and dynamic ways.  In the U.S., the nature and salience of group 
identities to putative group members ebbs and flows over time and
differs among its subgroups.  Intermarriage, for example, is a major 
cause of mixed and diluted ethnic identities.  The cultural norms and 
practices associated with a group evolve, as do the particular aspects 
of a group’s culture with which individual members identify.  This 
is especially evident among second-and third-generation immigrants. 
These evolutions, however, are neither logical nor linear.  K. Anthony 
Appiah suggests that the stridency of cultural identity claims may 
be inversely proportional to the robustness of their cultural content 
and their actual salience for the claimants; that this stridency is often 
greater for a group’s rising and integrating middle class members than 
for their poorer, more isolated co-ethnics; and that these assertions 
of cultural identity are sometimes nostalgic exercises concealing the 
erosion of the social infrastructure that supported and invigorated the 
culture in the past.  On this account, we must be careful to distinguish 
diversity of identity from diversity of culture.  After all, identity claims 
may bear little resemblance to the cultures they invoke.12  
Recognizing the complexity of identity (and hence of diversity), the 
economist Amartya Sen has made some conceptual distinctions that are 
useful in clarifying multiculturalism issues.  He distinguishes among 
12 K. Anthony Appiah, The Multiculturalist Misunderstanding, 44 N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Oct. 9, 1997, at 30, 32-33 (reviewing MICHAEL WALZER, TOLERATION (1997) 
and NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL MULTICULTURALISTS NOW (4th prtg. 2003)).
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three identity issues: with how many groups can one identify (“plural 
identity”); does one choose or discover identities (“identity choice”); 
and which other people whom one does not identify with, nevertheless 
have legitimate claims concerning one’s behavior (“beyond identity”). 
Within the realm of plural identity, Sen further distinguishes between 
competing and non-competing identities, focusing our attention on 
the extent of their compatibility.  Concerning identity choice, he 
distinguishes between different levels of freedom and constraint in 
such a choice, between temporary and permanent identity choices, 
and between the different moral responsibilities entailed in defending 
chosen and discovered identities.  
“Beyond identity” (or identity transcendence) has the greatest policy 
significance.  Here, Sen distinguishes between a moral or political
concern for others and a concern based on a common identity, and 
relatedly, between epistemic and ethical uses of identity in determining 
moral or political obligations.  “There is an inescapable crudity,” he 
says, “in thinking that we cannot sympathize with the joys and the 
miseries, the predicaments and the achievements, of others without 
seeing them as some kind of an extension of ourselves.”13
Demographic and substantive diversity.  Most diversity-talk, 
especially that which is descriptive in the above sense, refers to 
demographic diversity.  This is the distribution within a population of 
individuals who are grouped (by themselves or by others) according 
to a more or less objective and measurable attribute (e.g., age, gender, 
race, religion, nationality, language, income) that they share with 
other members of the designated group.  For example, one commonly 
describes an employer’s work force as diverse (or non-diverse) based 
on the extent to which members of various racial or gender groups 
(as demographers define them) are present in it.  The law often relies
on this demographic notion of diversity—counting, classifying, and 
regulating—and this reliance produces, as we shall see, a strong 
13  Amartya Sen, Beyond Identity: Other People, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 18, 2000, 
at 23-30.
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tendency to look to proportionality as the measure of the duties to 
diversify that the law may impose.14
Sometimes, however, we are interested in what I shall call 
substantive, rather than demographic, diversity.  One can use the idea 
of substantive diversity either descriptively or normatively.  When 
used descriptively, it refers to the distribution of some attribute that 
is not demographic in the sense just discussed.  Teachers who speak 
of diversity in the classroom, for example, might be referring not only 
(or not at all) to the distribution of such demographic characteristics 
among students but also (or instead) to the differences in the students’ 
viewpoints, experiences, methodologies, or academic training. 
The fact that so much diversity-talk disregards this distinction is 
exceedingly important.  Most proponents of diversity (and some 
opponents as well) seem to assume that demographic and substantive 
diversity are the same, or at least that the former is a proxy for the 
latter.  This assumption is often based on ignorance, laziness, or self-
deception.  Very occasionally, it is not an assumption at all but instead 
reflects a considered view that the proxy, while admittedly imperfect,
is nonetheless good enough for the purpose at hand.      
Official and unofficial diversity.  Diversity, whether viewed 
normatively or descriptively, may be officially certified or sanctioned
as such by some authority.  The demographic categories employed in 
the decennial Census and in affirmative action programs are examples
of official diversity.  Throughout our history, the Census has employed
an ever-changing list of officially-sanctioned categories for describing
and enumerating the U.S. population.15  In recent decades, this list 
14 Jim Chen, Is Affirmative Action Fair? Diversity in a Different Dimension:
Evolutionary Theory and Affirmative Action’s Destiny, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 825, 830 
(1998).
15 See, e.g., CLARA E. RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE: LATINOS, THE CENSUS, AND THE 
HISTORY OF ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000), see especially chs. 7-8; Stephan 
Thernstrom, American Ethnic Statistics, in IMMIGRANTS IN TWO DEMOCRACIES: FRENCH AND 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (Donald Horowitz & Gerard Noiriel eds., 1992); PETER SKERRY, 
COUNTING ON THE CENSUS?: RACE, GROUP IDENTITY, AND THE EVASION OF POLITICS (2000).
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has been caught up in partisan disputes, lawsuits, the administrative 
law of the modern welfare state, and the shibboleths of identity 
politics.16  (Part II discusses a few recent developments along these 
lines).  Another example is the certification of Indian tribes by the
federal government, which qualifies them for many economic and
status benefits denied to groups lacking this designation.17  Indeed, 
the government goes so far as to delegate its race-certifying function 
to an undefined Indian “community” and to require, as a condition for
Bureau of Indian Affairs hiring preferences, that the applicant produce 
a properly executed “Certificate of Indian Blood.”  As Peter Skerry
points out, the officially-designated tribes to whom the government
has ceded this authenticating power thereby control access to federal 
funds and other economic spoils, including casino gambling.18
In contrast, the identities of groups that lack this authoritative 
status must find recognition, legitimacy, and sustenance in other ways. 
Even here, however, official categories often have a spillover effect in
the private domain, where people may look to them for guidance or 
even adopt them outright.  In this way, official group categories—for
example, the “ethno-racial pentagon” (David Hollingers term19) used 
in affirmative action programs—may serve as focal points that reduce
uncertainty, coordinate behavior among competitors, and perhaps 
decrease regulatory compliance burdens.  But as I note in part III, 
official definition and certification of an identity or diversity tend
to impair its authenticity, legitimacy, and diversity-value, to deform 
its meanings, and to skew peoples’ incentives for self-identifying in 
particular ways.20  Is it coincidental, for example, that the number of 
16 SKERRY, COUNTING ON THE CENSUS?, supra note 15
17 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the 
Federal Courts, 56 U.  CHI. L. REV. 671, 712-727 (1989).
18 SKERRY, COUNTING ON THE CENSUS?, supra note 15, at 52, 149.
19 DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM (6th ed. 
2007).
20 Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 17.
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individuals who called themselves Indians more than tripled between 
1960 and 1990, far greater than the population increase, or that the 
applicants to the University of California who declined to state their 
race more than doubled in 1998, the first year without affirmative
action?21
Protecting, promoting, exploiting, and empowering diversity.  A 
society favorably disposed to diversity—in the history of the world, 
few have been so disposed—may approach it, generally speaking, 
in four different ways.  First, it may use the law to protect existing 
diversities or those that might arise in the future.  Protection, in this 
sense, evokes Berlin’s notion of negative liberties, discussed earlier. 
Second, the state may decide to affirmatively promote diversity rather 
than merely protecting it.  This term “promote” encompasses a number 
of different ways of using law affirmatively and programmatically to
instantiate a particular conception or ideal of diversity.  This distinction 
between protection and promotion is an important and principled one. 
Although neither is value-neutral—the government must choose among 
competing diversities when deciding which to protect, and protecting 
some particular diversity represents some commitment to an existing 
nomos22—promotion involves government placing its heavy thumb on 
the normative scales to a much greater extent, with problematic effects 
on the preferred diversity discussed in part III.   
Third, government may try to exploit the diversity that exists in 
order to advance its programmatic purposes.  Some communities in the 
U.S. have attempted to draw on America’s enormous religious diversity 
and its faith-based organizations in order to deliver publicly-funded 
social services, including education, more effectively, attempts that 
raise special constitutional and other difficulties.  Finally, government
may empower diversity.  In this mode, it helps people choose for 
themselves the kinds and levels of diversities that they prefer.  It does 
21 See Gregory Rodriguez, The Race to End Race, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2001, at 31.
22 See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1983).
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so by distributing resources people can spend in ways that yield the 
kinds of diversity they desire—whether or not officials would have
used those resources to pursue those particular diversities.  The stakes 
in deciding whether government should protect, promote, exploit, or 
empower diversity could hardly be higher.     
Inter-group and intra-group diversity.  Diversity today is usually 
discussed in group terms; it is deemed greater or lesser depending on 
how many groups are represented in the relevant unit.  (This is not 
to say that diversity is solely a quantitative phenomenon, only that 
the number of groups or attributes is one measure of it, along with 
others).  Accordingly, the difference between groups is commonly 
taken as the most salient factor bearing on diversity.  In an important 
sense, however, this way of thinking about diversity begs the more 
fundamental question of which attributes constitute a group in the 
first place.  Indeed, the differences within conventionally-defined
groups are often at least as significant as those that mark the inter-
group boundaries.  This is especially true when a gross demographic 
category like “Hispanics”23 or “blacks” is used as if it consisted of a 
discrete, homogeneous group when in fact it encompasses individuals 
whose commonalities are small compared to their differences.
Enclave and larger-scale diversity.  In discussing diversity, one 
should be clear about the unit of reference.  Since almost any kind 
of diversity will be greater in some geographic units than in others, 
diversity-talks coherence depends upon the spatial and temporal24 
23 The U.S. Census adopted this coinage as recently as 1980, although it made 
earlier efforts to classify this remarkably heterogeneous population, which descends 
from some two dozen nations, may be of any race, and is sharply differentiated between 
the U.S.-born and the foreign-born.  See Betsy Gusmàn, The Hispanic Population, 
CENSUS BRIEF 2000 (May 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
c2kbr01-3.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
24 Few, however, would go as far as the philosopher Leibniz, who defined reality to
include the diversity of all existent things—past, present, and future—and found this 
diversity, including evil, to constitute God’s creation and thus the best of all possible 
worlds.  See generally BENSON MATES, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNIZ: METAPHYSICS AND 
LANGUAGE 69-73 (1986). 
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domains being discussed.  This is most obviously true of descriptive 
statements (“The U.S. is more linguistically diverse than Sweden”), 
but it is also true of normative ones.  To pick a more complex example, 
saying that Firm X’s workforce should be more racially diverse makes 
little sense until one specifies the geographic area from which X can
draw its workers and the racial composition of that area.  In evaluating 
the moral implications of communities’ actions toward would-
be immigrants, Michael Walzer has observed that achieving more 
diversity in the larger society may mean less diversity in particular 
neighborhoods within it because of people’s wish to live with others 
like them.25  Whether Walzer is right or wrong about this, the distinction 
between the diversity in a given society (or trans-national or even 
global community) and that in some smaller area or enclave within it 
underscores the importance of spatial specifications in any discussion
of diversity.
The size of the unit has another implication for diversity.  Certain 
kinds of diversity cannot flourish or even exist unless the attribute
is distributed on a sufficiently large scale.  A language, for example,
can only survive if enough people use it to communicate frequently 
and intensely enough to sustain it and transmit it to others.  More 
generally, activities like computing and telephony whose value to 
people depends on the number of others engaging in them (thereby 
creating what economists call network externalities) require a certain 
scale to be robust.  For this reason, enclave cultures may satisfy their 
members emotionally but nevertheless be too small to be economically 
unsustainable.26  
Hard choices between different sites of diversity are often 
inescapable.  Under the Voting Rights Act, for example, legislatures and 
courts face the choice of increasing the racial diversity, demographically 
25 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
38-9 (1983).
26 See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS 
ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 169-74 (1990). 
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speaking, either of representatives in the legislature or of voters in 
individual districts.  If the former, concentrating voters of a given race 
into a relatively small number of districts may be necessary to assure 
legislative seats to representatives of that race (assuming racial bloc 
voting).  If the latter, then racial de-concentration will be sought, but it 
will reduce the probability of a racially diverse legislature. 
 
II. DEMOGRAPHY AND POLITICS: TWO EXAMPLES
Scientists have long discredited the notion of race, and the latest 
DNA research provides further evidence, were any needed, of its 
artificiality and incoherence.  Science aside, centuries of immigration
and miscegenation, and the recent rise in intermarriage rates by all 
groups render the conventional racial categories ever more arbitrary.27 
Yet powerful political interests cling to these categories with the 
tenacity of shipwreck victims grasping flotsam and jetsam.
Census categories.  Indeed, so many Americans now consider 
themselves multiracial and wish to be identified as such (if they must be
racially identified at all)—seven million in the 2000 Census, including
nearly two million blacks (5% of the black population) and 37% of 
all Native Americans28—that advocacy groups desperate to retain the 
demographic status quo—mounted a fierce political campaign to pre-
empt a multiracial category.29 
Although these mono-racial groups did not decisively win 
that battle—the Census allowed people to indicate more than one 
race but did not include a multiracial category30—they seem to be 
27 See also Chen, supra note 14, at 893-894.
28 Russell Thornton, What the Census Doesn’t Count, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, 
at A19 (discussing Native Americans); Eric Schmitt, Multiracial Identification Might
Affect Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at A20; Eric Schmitt, For 7 Million People 
in Census, One Race Category Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1.
29 SKERRY, COUNTING ON THE CENSUS?, supra note 15, at  51-4.
30 For a full explanation, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: OVERVIEW 
OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (2001).
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winning the war.  In a grimly ironic aspect of the new demographic 
dispensation, the government adopted something like the one-drop 
rule that helped enslave so many mulattos and self-identifying whites 
before Emancipation.  (As Malcolm X quipped, “That must be mighty 
powerful blood.”)31  In March 2000, the Office of Management and
Budget in the Executive Office of the President (“OMB”) issued rules
providing that for civil rights enforcement purposes,32 any response 
combining one minority race and the white race must be allocated to 
the minority race.33  This, despite evidence that 25% of those in the 
United States who describe themselves as both black and white actually 
consider themselves white.  Indeed, 48% of Hispanic respondents to 
the Census self-identified as white; another 42% said “some other
race.”34  In a survey by highly-trained Census enumerators of Hispanic 
households that had failed to respond to the mail questionnaire, 63% 
considered themselves white and 29% said “some other race.”  Almost 
half of Asian-white people and more than 80% of Indian-white people 
self-identified as white.35  (This is the racial equivalent of an enduring 
sociological reality: almost 95% of Americans, including many who 
are poor by standard “objective” measures, consider themselves 
solidly working or middle-class).36  Just as class warriors prefer to 
31 Quoted in AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY 30 (2001). 
32 The census has issued different allocation rules for purposes of legislative 
districting and other government decisions using such demographic categories. 
Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 899, 932 n.127 (2001) (brief discussion).
33 Office of Management and Budget, Guidance on Aggregation and Allocation of 
Data on Race for Use in  Civil Rights Monitoring and Enforcement,  BULL. NO. 00-02 
rule 2 (Mar. 9, 2000).  It is not clear whether the Bush administration will retain these 
rules.   
34 Eric Schmitt, Census Data Show a Sharp Increase in Living Standard, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A1.
35 Steven A. Holmes, The Confusion over Who We Are, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, 
at, WK1 (discussing National Health Interview Survey data). 
36 Gallup Poll (Sept. 1, 2000), was available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/
fromtheed/ed0009.asp.
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ignore this fact, administrators of affirmative action programs, who
desperately need to race-and-ethnic-code in order to meet their targets 
or quotas, choose to ignore the “whitening” and “multiracializing” of 
those whom they insist on treating as minorities.37
No allocation rule can be neutral, of course; OMB’s rule effectively 
maximizes the size of minority groups and minimizes that of the 
white group.  But where multiracial individuals chose their own racial 
identities, the government’s allocation rules now decide this matter for 
them in order to preserve racial preferences.  The new rules introduce 
other changes that will further complicate future race-coding by the 
government and hence by the many others who rely on these racial 
data for affirmative action and other purposes.  By recognizing no
fewer than 126 group combinations under the Census 2000 system, 
these rules encourage many other eager groups (Arab-Americans, for 
example) to demand their own specific listing in the Census form. 
The government will now find it harder to resist these demands than
when the ethno-racial pentagon was its exclusive taxonomy.  The new 
system, then, is inherently unstable.38
The number of actual and self-designating multiracial individuals 
will surely grow rapidly in the future due both to intermarriage and 
to younger respondents’ greater propensity to intermarry and to self-
identify as multiracial.  Sociologist Amitai Etzioni predicts that even 
if current trends do not accelerate, 14% of the population will identify 
as multiracial by 2050.39  Forcing them into the increasingly arbitrary 
categories to which traditional racial classifiers tenaciously cling will
37 For an exploration of the implications of multiracialism, see RACHEL F. MORAN, 
INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 154-78 (2001).
38 Kenneth Prewitt, Demography, Diversity, and Democracy: The 2000 Census 
Story, BROOKINGS REV. 6, 9 (Winter 2002).  The color-coding in Brazil, which is 
proposing to create racial quotas for universities, civil service jobs, and other areas, 
is likely to be far more complex and perhaps unworkable.  Larry Rohter, Multiracial 
Brazil Planning Quotas for Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at A3 (over 300 terms 
for different skin colors and more elastic racial categories).
39 ETZIONI, supra note 31, at 26-7.
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spur them to seek even more fundamental changes in the ethno-racial 
pentagon, including a separate multiracial category or perhaps even 
eliminating racial categories altogether, as a proposed initiative in 
California hopes to do.  The government’s insistent pigeonholing, 
which clashes with the robust and, for Americans, compelling rhetoric 
and ideology of freedom of choice, will further erode the already weak 
public support for preferences. 
 Some analysts wishfully think that the multiracial phenomenon does 
not threaten the viability of the traditional civil rights programs that rely 
on racial data, both because the cohort of self-reporting multiracials 
is (so far) relatively small and because OMB’s allocation rules further 
reduce their numerical significance.40  Although this may well be 
true for the immediate future, advocates of the ethno-racial pentagon 
have only a temporary reprieve.  New demographics and identities 
mean that as time goes on, the government’s use of the standard racial 
categories as a pivot of social policy will become ever harder to justify 
logically and sustain politically.  These standard categories may once 
have been defensible as reflecting the oppressive reality of America’s
racist history, but the stubborn insistence by self-interested politicians 
and group leaders on maintaining them in the face of immense social 
changes that undermine the integrity of those categories is creating a 
growing obstacle to the nation’s efforts to transcend that history.  
Ethno-racial profiling.  The effort to control ethno-racial profiling by
the police through the gathering of race-coded identity information, while 
aimed at discrimination and not affirmative action, reveals an important
irony about the latter as well.41  Just when the accuracy, coherence, and 
40 See, e.g., Persily, supra note 32.  But see JOSHUA R. GOLDSTEIN & ANN J. 
MORNING, BACK IN THE BOX: THE DILEMMA OF USING MULTIPLE-RACE DATA FOR SINGLE-
RACE LAWS (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Office of Population
Research, Princeton University) (noting that allocation rule will disadvantage Asian-
Americans and reassign many who traditionally self-identified as white).
41 On racial profiling, see Peter H. Schuck, A Case for Profiling, AM. LAWYER, Jan. 
2002, at 59.  Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling under Attack, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002).
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social value of racial classification information are rapidly declining, the
law is demanding more of it and using it more intrusively.  State and city 
police departments must now collect data on the race, ethnicity, or national 
origin of all drivers or other individuals whom they stop.  In order to do 
so, the officer must decide what the motorists’ race, ethnicity, or national
origin are and then record the data for the profiling monitor—without
asking them, much less allowing them, to self-identify.  To a lament by 
the president of the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners (himself 
multiracial) that “[w]ith all the racially mixed people in L.A., and Latinos 
coming in all shades, the data will be garbage in, garbage out,” a Harvard 
law professor responds that “[w]e’re not trying to get at truth, we’re trying 
to get at bias.”42  But the legitimacy of the search for bias has everything 
to do with what information the naturally confused police will record and 
how accurate it is.  
Of the other techniques that may be used to obtain the racial data, 
the least chilling is already in place: New Jersey taxpayers paid for all 
2700 state troopers to receive mandatory “instruction on how to classify 
a motorist’s race by judging ‘skin color’ and ‘facial characteristics.’”43 
These officers are being encouraged, indeed required by law, to color-
code individuals on the basis of what surely are dubious definitions and
methodologies at the very moment that American society is struggling 
to make progress toward its proclaimed goal of color-blindness.  In the 
name of advancing racial justice, one supposes, every bad idea must 
be taken seriously and even subsidized, at least until the inevitable 
political backlash against this new policy erupts—perhaps in the form 
of a voter referendum that will ratchet up the political rhetoric, racial 
bitterness, and group alienation.  In this way, we are told, America will 
somehow “get beyond racism”44 and enhance racial equality.
42 Gregory Rodriguez, When Perception is Reality, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at 
WK1 (quoting Margo J. Schlanger).
43 Id.
44 The phrase was popularized by Justice Blackmun. Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment 
and dissenting in part). 
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 These two American examples, which could readily be multiplied, 
suggest a number of lessons about the intersection of human rights 
discourse and demographic factors in liberal democracies, lessons 
that although varying in important ways from society to society likely 
have a common core across these societies.  I say “likely” because all 
of these societies, whatever their differences, continue to experience 
sharp cultural conflicts between liberal, tolerant values and entrenched,
inegalitarian, and often discriminatory social practices.   
 The first lesson is that the political salience of ethno-racial
demographic categories today depends more on their historical 
valence and conventional character than on the categories’ current 
cultural or scientific coherence.  There is no escape from the bitter
histories that have divided dominant and subordinate groups in each 
country; these histories cast a dark shadow over most contemporary 
public controversies and understandings.  Whether the issue is public 
education, health care, family structure and stability, crime, economic 
growth, taxes, capital punishment military service, profiling, or
abortion, fairness concerns rooted in historic but continuing social 
inequalities are endemic to the debate.
 Human rights discourse increasingly pervades these debates.  Even 
in the U.S., which is exceptionally self-conscious about (and proud of) 
its exceptionalism, questions about how other countries address and 
resolve these issues are constantly raised.  The U.S. Supreme Court, for 
example, is now engaged in a fascinating legal debate, joined by legal 
scholars and politicians, about whether and to what extent the Court 
should use, or even look to, foreign and international law sources in 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution.  Both Congress and recent presidents 
of both parties have rejected, or interposed important reservations to, 
international agreements, including human rights treaties such as the 
Convention Against Torture45 and the Convention on the Elimination 
45 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.46  Nevertheless, the 
political price being paid for going it alone on these issues is higher 
than ever before.     
 A second lesson is that we must broaden our thinking and debates 
about human rights in recognition of the breadth of human interests 
and values that the policies in question actually implicate.  Current 
discourse tends to focus on individual rights to the exclusion of 
broader social interests which the individuals in question also share, 
perhaps even more intensely than society in general.  It is clear, for 
example, that poor people and minorities in general are more likely to 
be victimized by most kinds of crime than are other, less vulnerable 
people.  For this reason, they may prefer that the law strike a different 
balance between liberty and security than others might prefer.  Thus, 
we should not be surprised to learn that in the U.S. many residents 
of crime-ridden public housing projects are willing (indeed eager) to 
waive their Fourth Amendment freedom from “unreasonable searches 
and seizures” by the police in order to allow (indeed encourage) the 
police to conduct searches of their buildings with a view to ferreting 
out vicious criminal activity there.  This is a hard choice that more 
fortunate Americans need not face—or if they faced it, might make 
differently.  Here, as in so many other areas, the problem is not to 
protect a human right but rather to find the appropriate balance among
competing human interests which, when society decides to protect 
them, we then call human rights.  A healthy respect for diversity will 
recognize that the balance may and should be different for people in 
different life circumstances.  When we flourish the banner of human
rights, then, we must be certain not only that these rights are well-
defined but that they are properly defined universally rather than
contextually (as in my low-income public housing project example). 
To the extent that we define them contextually, of course, they cease
to be human—that is to say, universal—rights, and instead become 
46 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
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contingent rights, dependent on particular factors.  This is a dilemma 
that must be squarely faced, not swept under the rhetorical rug. 
 Finally, and of particular interest to scholars, any rational resolution 
of these conflicts between demographic factors and human rights goals
will—or at least should—depend on empirical facts and normative 
judgments that are very difficult to establish with the accuracy that the
importance of the subject warrants.  How much diversity—of opinion, 
of socio-economic status, of other important variables—is there within 
the groups that law and demography often treat as monoliths?  In the 
U.S., the demographic group “Hispanics” is a particularly meaningless 
aggregation of highly disparate sub-groups who have little in common 
besides their language of origin.  As other demographic groups 
diversify, they too tend to have less in common.  What are the real 
empirical tradeoffs among conflicting policy goals and norms, and
how much do people actually value these conflicting goals and norms? 
Who is in the best position to speak for different groups or sub-groups? 
More specifically, with respect to profiling, how do minority group
members actually feel about profiling that is designed to protect them
from criminal activity but that disproportionately targets members of 
their group?  Does the answer to this question depend on whether 
the purpose of the profiling—and the inevitable needle-in-a-haystack
problem—is respectfully explained to members of the group rather 
than being administered peremptorily and without a concern for their 
dignity?  Research on these and many other empirical questions is 
needed.
III. THE AMERICAN WAY OF DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT
In my book Diversity in America,47 I studied how the issue of 
diversity in the U.S. has been understood and treated in a number of 
different public policy domains, particularly immigration, affirmative
action, residential patterns, and religion (including so-called “charitable 
47 SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA, supra note 5.
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choice” and “school choice”).  I distilled this experience into four forms. 
First, certain factual premises should be the foundation for diversity 
management, American-style.  They include the facts that the diversity 
ideal is a very recent cultural innovation confined largely to North
America; that diversity is neither good nor bad in itself; that diversity 
is often a zero-sum game (i.e., a situation in which more diversity in 
one area or at one level means less diversity in another area or level); 
that current diversity management efforts are not ideologically pure, 
analytically crisp, and internally coherent but are instead decidedly 
messy and dissonant; that existing diversity management is largely 
a civil society function; and that diversity’s social value depends on 
its provenance.  Second, certain normative principles should shape 
our diversity ideals.  Third, certain prescriptive policies should guide 
diversity management.  Finally, Americans should observe certain 
private punctilios as they interact in an increasingly diverse civil and 
political society.  Here, I shall discuss only the normative principles 
and prescriptive policies.
A. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
Government should not try to create, certify, or cultivate specific
diversities.  I noted earlier that diversity generates many social values 
and disvalues, depending on the political and social norms people 
embrace.  From an economic perspective, diversity is a collective or 
public good in the technical sense that many of its benefits and costs
are externalized to the society as a whole.  It follows from this view 
that voluntary actions alone cannot produce the “right” amount or kind 
of diversity; only government can do so by subsidizing good diversity 
and limiting bad diversity.  
But this is what philosophers call a category mistake.  Unlike other 
public goods whose value does not depend on who produces them or 
where they come from, diversity’s value depends on its provenance. 
Genuine diversity (hence diversity-value) is a far more fragile thing 
than lawmakers seem to suppose; the crude regulatory resources and 
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techniques at law’s disposal are more likely to asphyxiate it than to 
invigorate it.  For this reason, precisely how government conceives 
of and implements diversity management matters a great deal.  Some 
efforts meant to increase diversity-value may indeed do so but others 
will debase or destroy it.  The fact that diversity is a public good, 
then, does not imply that government should manage it.  It is always 
an open question whether a particular form of public law increases or 
reduces diversity-value.  
Let us distinguish among different ways in which government 
can and does approach diversity.  Immigration laws literally import 
diversities that persist even as the process of assimilation transforms 
them in complex ways.  Our immigration stream is now so diverse in 
terms of ethnicity, language, race, religion, and national origin that 
efforts to diversify it further cannot yield much additional diversity-
value.  The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, taken together, 
protect an extraordinarily diverse mélange of religious groups, 
beliefs, and practices—even though I think that the Court could and 
should protect even more religious diversity than it does.  By barring 
discrimination against minorities, the law also protects diversity. 
Political diversity receives strong legal protection.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court’s fidelity to the protection of flag burning, hate speech,
and other political deviance is praiseworthy.48  It is also remarkable, 
given the statist values of most of the current justices.49          
48 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (flag burning); R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (hate speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969) (incendiary speech).  Hate-crime laws, however, are permitted to 
regulate hate speech when coupled with criminal behavior.  See generally JAMES 
B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND IDENTITY POLITICS 
(1998); FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 
(1999).  The political pressure to expand the scope of hate-crime laws continues.  See 
Christopher Marquis, Man is Charged in Two Killings That U.S. Calls Hate Crime, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at A27, (Senator Kennedy pressing administration to 
support bill covering sex, sexual orientation, and disability).   
49 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down 
federal statute restricting child pornography on the Internet).  
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Sometimes, however, government seeks not simply to protect 
an existing diversity but to create or promote a new one.  These 
two enterprises are very different.  In order to promote a particular 
diversity, government must define, measure, and certify it as one 
deserving special legal recognition and support.  This requires it, in 
turn, to make determinations about provenance and authenticity that 
it is singularly ill-equipped to make.  The Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
for example, decides which groups it will recognize as tribes for 
purposes of various federal benefits, with the most valuable benefit
today being tribal eligibility to establish potentially lucrative 
gambling casinos.  These incentives have embroiled the Bureau, 
tribes, and individuals in high-stakes disputes over who is and is not 
an Indian and which groups of Indians constitute tribes.50  Perverse 
certification is also exemplified by the recent decennial Census,
which (as discussed in part II) reveals how official definitions,
measurements, and certifications of ethno-racial groups reify and (at
least for a time) ossify anachronistic categories, distort behavioral 
incentives, and politicize identities that, I have argued, should be 
matters of private, unsubsidized choice.  The Census’s handling of the 
Indian, black, and Hispanic groupings is particularly problematic.51 
(The fact that the Census was conducted with great professionalism 
only confirms that these distortions are systemic and inevitable). 
An equally troubling, if no less well-meaning, instance of official
certification of diversity, noted in part II, is training state troopers
to determine and then code each driver’s race for purposes of anti-
profiling statistics.
50 See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Two Feuding Indian Tribes Are Recognized, but 
as One, N.Y. TIMES , June 25, 2002, at B5; Timothy Egan, Lawsuit in California Asks, 
Whose Tribe is it, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at A24, (a woman and her two 
children claim to be tribe); Brent Staples, The Seminole Tribe, Running from History, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2002, at WK12 (dispute over quantity of “Seminole blood”). 
See generally JEFF BENEDICT, WITHOUT RESERVATION: THE MAKING OF AMERICA’S MOST 
POWERFUL INDIAN TRIBE AND FOXWOODS, THE WORLD’S LARGEST CASINO (2000).
51 See generally SKERRY, COUNTING ON THE CENSUS?, supra note 15. 
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Having certified a certain kind of diversity as worthy of public
promotion, government will then either subsidize or mandate it—
particularly if it is a kind that the relevant community resists.  Diversity 
in America’s analyses of mandatory ethno-racial preferences, court-
ordered integration of residential neighborhoods across class lines, 
and required bilingual education for cultural maintenance, reveal the 
dismal failures of most of these efforts.52  That the government had 
plausible reasons and better remedial alternatives makes these failures 
all the sadder. 
Why is it so much harder for government to promote new 
diversities than to protect old ones?  I have already discussed one 
largely structural reason: the tight link between diversity’s value and 
its provenance.  We value diversity only if and to the extent that we 
think it arises from a legitimate source and perceive it as authentic, 
natural, and uncontrived.  We care about where the diversity comes 
from and whether the process that produced it comports with deeply-
held norms about moral desert and instrumental appropriateness.  We 
value diversity that seems to reflect human spontaneity, personality,
and achievement (e.g., performance-based selection of students and 
workers, or cultural maintenance managed by immigrant families) 
more highly than diversity that government designs, manufactures, 
certifies, and mandates (e.g., choosing students by skin color, or
promoting Spanish for immigrant children whose parents want them 
to learn English quickly).      
52 In brief, and with some over-simplification: The preferences have had often
inconsistent and incoherent rationales, largely aided those who would have succeeded 
without them, undermined and confused the notion of merit, exacerbated inter-group 
conflicts, produced bureaucratic dissembling, and created suspicion about favored
groups’ achievements (SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at ch. 5).  Court-
ordered residential integration across racial and economic class lines have (in two of 
the three major case studies) led to little integration but endless litigation, frustration, 
and heightened inter-group hostility (ch. 6).  Bilingual education has often retarded 
minority student English fluency (id. at ch. 4).
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Although law has many strengths, the ability to create the values 
and experiences we associate with genuine diversity is not one of them. 
To contemporary Americans, law is not a mystical emanation from a 
majestic sovereign, but a technocratic, artifactual tool of social control 
that we assess according to the more mundane criteria of consent, 
efficiency, fairness, and effectiveness.  Democratically-legitimated
law carries moral force, to be sure, but its ubiquity has disenchanted 
and demystified it.  We no longer stand in awe of it.53 
Law cannot easily extract diversity-value from processes that 
render the resulting diversity artificial in the eyes of people who
believe in academic or occupational merit, class-based neighborhoods, 
immigrant assimilation and economic mobility, and other values. 
Coercive law has failed (though certainly not for want of trying) to 
legitimate ethno-racial preferences, integrate the suburbs, and educate 
limited-English-speaking children—even when wrapping itself in the 
mantle of constitutional principle.  This inability to create diversity-
value, as distinguished from protecting it from suppression, may be 
part of a larger limitation endemic to law.  Robert Fogel suggests that 
while the law successfully redistributed material gains in the past, it 
has less purchase on the spiritual values that contemporary Americans 
increasingly seek.54  Fogel’s insight, I maintain, also applies to 
diversity-value.
These findings bespeak a paradox about diversity and law.  The
harder the law tries to create or promote diversity, the more it magnifies
and highlights its own weaknesses, and the more it reveals the 
diversity it seeks to be inauthentic, illegitimate, and disvalued.  This 
paradox is also evident, albeit far less dramatically, in other diversity-
mandating efforts.  In the hope of rescuing affirmative action from
a reality of sharp differentials in group academic performance, the 
University of California has repeatedly resorted to new manipulations 
53 See Cover, supra note 22.
54 ROBERT W. FOGEL, THE FOURTH GREAT AWAKENING AND THE FUTURE OF EGALITARIANISM 
214 (2000).
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and dissimulations that must sow cynicism about both law and the 
diversity ideal.55  The same is true, mutatis mutandis, when—as has 
often happened with bilingual education in the U.S— government 
sacrifices immigrants’ assimilation and education in order to maintain
a culture whose authenticity and hence actual value depend on a 
provenance of unregulated, unmediated efforts by motivated families 
and communities, not on government mandates.56   
Indeed, the paradox of an earnest government defeating its own 
best efforts is even crueler than this.  In truth, government and law are 
natural enemies of diversity, especially when they are most eager to 
create it.  The reasons have nothing to do with motives or incentives 
and everything to do with the nature of law, government, and diversity. 
Consider, for example, the categories that law uses to structure legal 
discourse, doctrine, and responsibility.57  Ordinarily, we assess people 
and things according to the many dimensions along which they vary: 
size, strength, beauty, speed, intelligence, morality, humor, culpability, 
value, and the like.  In contrast, law—especially regulatory law—
typically seeks to govern social phenomena through simple binary, yes-
or-no categories.  It seldom uses the kind of continuous categories of 
more-or-less that refine our perceptions and discourse, and that render
everyday life intelligible and nuanced.  A citizen beholding law’s 
skeletal classifications often protests in the name of common sense:
“The real world isn’t black and white; it is all a matter of degree.”  
Law knows this, of course, but it pretends otherwise.  Plausible 
arguments exist for using reductionist classifications in public law, and
they usually carry the day.  Such classifications, for example, allow us to
make, apply, and comprehend law more cheaply and more predictably 
than if the rule traced the bewildering variety and semiotic complexity 
of social life.  Public law’s hope is to use simplistic categories to 
55 See SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 183-85. 
56  Id. at 109-23.
57  The rest of this paragraph draws on PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS 
ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, ch. 13, esp. 427-32 (2000).
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facilitate legislators’ control of regulators and regulators’ control of 
the rest of us.  Certain legal techniques, of course, can temper rules’ 
reductionism.  Lawmakers, for example, can include more categories, 
replace bright-line tests with more flexible, contextual standards,
and permit exceptions to be made.  These techniques, however, have 
their own drawbacks.  A nuanced law is more complex and costly to 
understand and apply.  Moving from clear rules to vague standards 
delegates discretion to those who apply and enforce them, such as 
citizens, juries, or bureaucrats, thus reducing accountability and 
inviting arbitrariness and unpredictability.  Exceptions may swallow, 
weaken, or de-legitimate the rules to which they apply.  
Even at the most formal level, then, it is more problematic for 
public law to define, certify, and cultivate diversity than for it to protect
(and in some cases, exploit) a diversity that civil society has already 
authenticated and valorized.  Genuine diversity-value is a product of 
an opaque, complex, dynamic, mysterious realm of human meaning 
and identity that we call culture.  When law seeks to create this culture 
of diversity, it exhibits a serious disability that cannot be overcome 
or accommodated.  The best that we can hope to do is understand its 
sources and minimize its worst effects.
  Government has an essential role in protecting diversity from 
discrimination and monopoly.  Government, I have argued, should 
use its bully pulpit to praise diversity in general and even particular 
diversities, as President Bush did shortly after September 11 when he 
exhorted Americans to treat Muslims with respect.58  But, as noted in 
part I, government should not try to create or promote any particular 
kind of diversity.  I have explained why this is not a proper public 
function in a society committed to liberal and democratic values and 
why, in any event, law is a singularly poor instrument for performing 
that function.  
58 George Bush, Remarks at the Islamic Center Washington, D.C., soon after the 
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/muslimlife/
bushword.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
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This does not mean, however, that government has no role to play 
in protecting diversity or indeed in promoting it as a social ideal.  Far 
from it.  Government is indispensable to protecting existing diversities 
and emerging ones from suppression, and it can clear the channels 
through which new diversities, some now impossible to discern, may 
yet be born.59  Indeed, only government can protect groups whose 
beliefs and practices differ from those of a dominant group that wants 
to use the law to impose its own.60  Almost all majority impositions are 
perfectly appropriate in a democracy, but when they regulate ethno-
racial, religious, political, or associational diversities, the Constitution 
requires a higher-than-usual standard of justification.  
Government’s management of diversity should take three general 
forms.  First, government should protect diversities against invidious 
discrimination.  Second, it should challenge various forms of monopoly 
power, especially its own, in order to clear a path for the emergence 
of more diversities.  Third, it should empower diversity by enhancing 
the role of individual and group choice.  I shall discuss each of these 
in turn.
Anti-discrimination.  In a society dedicated to genuine equal 
opportunity, the law must assure individuals that they will not be 
denied it on the basis of attributes used to stigmatize, subordinate, 
or otherwise disadvantage the group.  This means creating anti-
discrimination remedies like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991 and ensuring their accessibility 
and effectiveness.61  The goal of anti-discrimination law is justice, 
59  The analogy here is to JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980), which justifies the use of judicial power to open the channels
of political change.
60 The dominant group in one community may be a minority elsewhere—the 
Mormons in Utah, for example.  For international examples see Amy L. Chua, Markets, 
Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 
YALE L. J. 1 (1998).
61 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
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conceived of as equal opportunity for individuals, not diversity.  Anti-
discrimination law may produce more demographic diversity than 
otherwise in a particular setting; this is beside its central point, which 
is justice.  (By definition, as we saw earlier, the law reduces diversity 
in another sense when it prevents employers or others from using 
certain screening criteria).  
In contrast, affirmative action—at least in its more robust,
preferential forms—promotes many new injustices in the name of 
remedying an old one.  It does so by favoring one racial or ethnic group 
over others either for historical reasons that do not really apply to 
many of its supposed beneficiaries (e.g., immigrants), or for diversity
reasons that government can neither legitimately mandate nor sensibly 
design.  These preferences do so, moreover, at a time when rapid 
demographic changes are making them increasingly difficult to justify
or administer.  
  A society that truly values diversity must also limit the scope 
of the non-discrimination norm, precious as that norm is.  Anti-
discrimination law was originally intended to protect blacks and other 
minorities who are most vulnerable to majority oppression and whom 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant 
to protect from exclusion and subordination.  More recently, anti-
discrimination remedies have been extended to many groups —for 
example, the elderly, parents of children, and motorcyclists—that do 
not, and should not— receive the same level of constitutional protection 
from majority rule.62  Lesser protection for a group may be justified
because it can adequately protect itself in the political process and the 
market (e.g., parents or women), or because forcing group members to 
transact with others (e.g., homosexuals, families with small children, 
Medicaid recipients, the obese) would violate the members’ interests 
in freely choosing their own associations.  Non-discrimination is a 
62 For analysis of these and other examples, see David E. Bernstein, 
Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MONT. L. REV. 83, 106-7 
(2001).
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compelling ideal, but so is the value of individuals joining with others 
in common fellowship and commitments defined by them and not by
the state.  
The Supreme Court has only begun to develop the contours of 
this right of “expressive association.”  In a recent line of decisions, 
the Court has wrestled with the problem of reconciling two claims: a 
group’s desire to define and express its members’values by associating
with like-minded people and excluding others, and an excluded 
individual’s claim under anti-discrimination law to equal treatment 
and inclusion.  In order for members to develop a group’s distinctive 
identity, they must often exclude others whom they believe, rightly or 
wrongly, will dilute or deform that identity.  This may cause pain to 
some of the excluded and may also offend outsiders, as the Boy Scouts’ 
exclusion of avowed homosexuals has done,63 generating a flood of
negative publicity and resistance by local units.  Reconciling these 
claims is unlikely to yield clear rules.  Outcomes will likely depend on 
such factors as the particular trait on which the exclusion is based; the 
trait’s effect on the group’s values, coherence, and claimed identity; the 
clarity and consistency of this identity; the group’s “market power”; 
its opportunities for internal dissent and exit; and the nature of the 
evidence required to establish these facts.  But a liberal state that truly 
values diversity must protect individuals’ freedom to form groups 
that have exclusive identities, embrace unpopular beliefs, and act on 
those beliefs within constitutional bounds.  To those excluded by such 
groups, the state should say: “The law equally protects your right to 
form your own groups around your own identities and to contest the 
norms of those who exclude you.  In a diverse civil society where the 
state must tread lightly in matters of autonomous group life, this is the 
only quality that the law guarantees.”
63 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  For a very brief discussion 
of this case and this issue see Peter H. Schuck, Diversity Demands Exclusivity, AM. 
LAWYER, Sept. 2000, at 67.
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In such a society, the breathing space for disparate identities will 
often produce private groups affirming norms that are less egalitarian
than the norms enforced or proposed by the state.  Protecting the right 
of groups to maintain these differences is one important way in which 
the law can counter the state’s inevitable effort to monopolize norms 
that should instead be diverse.  I now turn to two other ways: anti-
monopoly and enhanced choice.
Anti-monopoly.  No one doubts that the law should prevent public 
and private entities from exercising monopoly power over others, 
although precisely how this should be done is certainly debatable.  In 
the economic domain, anti-trust law is a charter for economic diversity 
(or at least for efficient levels of it).  In the political domain, the First
Amendment bars the state from imposing its views on the citizenry, 
preferring some groups over others, or stifling speech and viewpoint
diversity.  Indeed, a robust First Amendment is the most powerful legal 
shield for protecting many other kinds of diversity.  But a diversity-
friendly government should do much more than refrain from violating 
the First Amendment.  It should also use the law affirmatively to limit
various kinds of non-economic monopolies.  For example, government 
can diversify campaign finance by giving citizens more control over
the allocation of campaign dollars.64  When it speaks65—for example, 
in sponsoring art or funding legal services66—it can do so in ways 
that facilitate the expression of existing diversities.  It can begin 
planning a phase-out (or at least an appropriate disclaimer) of ethno-
racial statistics and categories whose growing artificiality, crudeness,
inaccuracy, and capacity to mislead are already distorting public policy 
64 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM 
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 12-24 (2002).  The campaign reform law enacted in March 
2002 will do none of this.  
65 See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND 
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
66 See, e.g., Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (federally 
funded lawyers represent their clients’ interests, not the government’s).
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discourse67 and will do so even more in the future.  Government can 
also nourish institutions, practices, and technologies in which diverse 
visions of the good can meet, compete, and interact—sometimes in the 
“public square,” sometimes in private ones.  It can favor decentralized 
political and economic decision-making.  Perhaps most important, 
it can support educational systems that prepare young people for 
the diverse ways of comprehending and living in a world far more 
dynamic than the one inhabited by their parents.
Choice.  Free and informed choice is the principal legitimating 
provenance of diversity.  It constitutes an exercise of individual freedom 
and autonomy, which in the liberal (and some other) conceptions of 
value is an, and perhaps the, ultimate good.  In the public sphere, the 
exercise of choice also nourishes and exemplifies active citizenship
and democratic participation.  In civil society, it animates private 
associations, institutions, and markets that help to satisfy basic human 
needs.  Moreover, such choice tends to legitimate its objects in the 
eyes of society.  Precisely what preconditions must be satisfied in order
for “free and informed choice” to exist is a fundamental and often 
controversial question, but its answer is highly context-dependent and 
that analysis need not detain us here.
The importance of both protecting and promoting choice is a 
particular principle of diversity management.  In Diversity in America, 
I provide many applications of this principle in different public policy 
domains.  Government should allow individuals to self-identify as 
they wish rather than imputing its own ethno- racial identifiers to
them.  Parents should have more say about the linguistic education 
of their children.  “Diversity visas”68 should be sold to qualifying 
67 The struggle over multiracial options in the 2000 Census suggests just how 
difficult it will be politically to move in this direction.
68 Under U.S. immigration law, 50,000 visas per year are reserved for individuals 
selected on the basis of their supposed diversity value.  It is also known as the Green 
Card Lottery.  The lottery is administered on an annual basis by the Department of 
State.  Section 131 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 amended § 203 of 
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worker-bidders.  Like religious organizations, secular groups seeking 
a common identity within constitutional bounds should not be 
condemned by anti-discrimination laws.  Housing integration should be 
promoted by giving target beneficiaries vouchers for rent, search, and
other mobility services.  Religious practices should be accommodated 
unless they violate a compelling public interest.  Recipients of social 
service subsidies should have equal access to faith-based providers.  
These proposals all have a common feature and goal—to increase 
people’s power over choices that government now preempts.  Absent 
market failure (e.g., monopoly) or other overriding reasons for 
government choice, social welfare is maximized by having resource 
allocation decisions made by the affected individuals and firms, not
government.  In the liberal tradition, however, the normative value 
of choice transcends considerations of efficiency.  Choice is how
we exercise our freedom, and diversity is its inevitable product. 
Americans’ veneration of individual choice is evident in public debates 
over abortion, smoking, school vouchers, and a host of other issues. 
In each of these debates, competing interests jockey for the political 
advantage of using choice rhetoric to justify their causes.  A less 
obvious point is that reliance on decentralized choice reduces political 
conflict.  This is a social virtue going well beyond the efficiency and
autonomy values enjoyed by those who exercise it.  Muting this conflict
is essential to the survival of a polity as diverse and competitive as 21st 
century America.69 
 Many American institutions serve this purpose.70  Federalism 
and a decentralized party system diffuse much political conflict by
the US Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 8 U.S.C. (2000) providing a new class 
of immigrants “diversity immigrants or DV immigrants.”  For a sharp critique of this 
program, see SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 123-31. 
69 The variable scope of political conflict is the theme of E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, 
THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1975).
70 The rest of this paragraph draws on SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW, supra note 57, 
at ch. 3.
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channeling it to the states and localities rather than elevating it to the 
level of higher-stakes national policymaking.  Courts at all levels 
resolve litigation in a fragmented, low visibility fashion.  Lay juries, 
seldom used outside the U.S., conceal and spread responsibility for 
what are often political decisions through their local and independent 
character, ad hoc form, Delphic opacity, and exercise of subjective 
judgment.71  The separation of powers also diffuses responsibility for 
political decisions (although it does encourage inter-branch conflicts). 
Many choices that in other countries require political decision are 
governed in the U.S. largely by contract law and markets rather 
than by public law and politics.  The American private sector is also 
relatively decentralized.  Small firms account for most economic
activity, non-profit groups abound, religions are organizationally and
often liturgically decentralized, and so forth. 
This decentralization of choice to private individuals and groups and 
to lower-level governments is a vital element of America’s approach 
to conflict reduction.  When politicians cannot agree on a uniform
rule to resolve a controversial issue, they often allow it to be decided 
by the concerned individuals or groups, using phrases like “freedom 
of choice” and “local option” to describe and dignify this deference. 
As American life becomes more diverse, complex, and competitive, 
such conflict-reducing techniques must be extended and new ones
devised.  For this reason, I have proposed a number of programmatic 
devices designed to empower diversity by moving the loci of choice 
from politicians, bureaucrats, and judges to individuals and private 
groups.72  For example, the law should allow expressive groups to 
limit their memberships to those whom they think will further their 
group identity; make cultural maintenance a responsibility of families, 
not government; use means-tested vouchers for housing, schools, 
bilingual education, and other publicly-funded benefits; accommodate
deviant religious practices more broadly; and end mandatory race-
71 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
72 SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA, supra note 5, passim.
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based affirmative action except in the narrow remedial usage now
permitted by the United States Supreme Court.73
Expanded choice can also be used to defuse other kinds of conflicts. 
Consider the controversies that rage in numerous communities over 
school curricula, particularly over whether to teach Darwinism, 
creationism, “intelligent design,” or some other (pseudo-)scientific
creed.74  Like most educational policy issues, this one is resolved by 
local school boards, which obviates the need for a national consensus, 
but of course engenders a large number of local conflicts.  The ferocity
of these struggles, however, is largely due to the monopolistic nature 
of the public school system in these communities.  This monopoly 
raises the stakes by mandating a single, one-size-fits-all curriculum,
which just happens to also be bureaucratically convenient.  Yet a 
public school system is by no means limited to this monistic solution. 
It could allow its schools to teach different versions of science, a 
freedom that some publicly-sponsored charter schools now enjoy.  By 
relaxing its monopoly over the curriculum and giving low-income 
families financially viable choices among schools offering different
curricula and other controversial features, government could reduce 
many conflicts.  Subsidized choice could have much the same effect
on conflicts over public housing, public transportation, and many other
public services that government now provides in relatively monolithic 
take-it-or-leave-it form to those who cannot afford to leave the public 
system.  
I am not suggesting that enhanced choice is equally compelling in 
all of these different policy domains.  Officials must always weigh the
value of a national, uniform, or mandatory rule against the value of a 
decentralized, variable, or permissive rule—or of no rule at all, leaving 
the choice entirely to individual choice.  The advantages of diversifying 
73 See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 
S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
74 See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Ohio Board Hears Debate on an Alternative to 
Darwinism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at A16.
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school curricula, for example, must be balanced against the desire to 
equip all students for a common democratic American citizenship. 
Spillover effects, which are ubiquitous in complex, interdependent 
societies, can often be effectively regulated only through mandatory 
rules that preempt local or individual choices.  In contrast, goods like 
low-income housing and social services are best provided in forms that 
respond to the different needs and desires of different individuals and 
groups.  Even when government decides to regulate private conduct 
through a mandatory rule, as it often does, it should always authorize 
exceptions to the rule unless they would defeat the rule’s underlying 
policy.75  More generally, government should not demand uniformity 
and limit choice more than a suitably refined, targeted policy requires. 
This principle is neither anodyne nor tautological.  Taken seriously, it 
would condemn or alter an immense body of public law.76 
In urging government to facilitate diversity by deferring more to 
private (and lower-level governmental) choices, I do not wish to fetishize 
either diversity or choice.  Diversity is not always an unalloyed virtue; 
its costs may sometimes be severe.  Choice, for its part, only merits its 
elevated normative status in the liberal tradition when it is sufficiently
voluntary and informed.  (I say “sufficiently” because choices are almost
always constrained and based on imperfect knowledge, so voluntariness 
and information are inevitably matters of degree).  And although 
more choice is generally desirable, there can be too much of a good 
thing.  (Mae West famously retorted that “too much of a good thing is 
wonderful”).77  Too many choices, empirical evidence suggests, may 
increase anxiety and decision costs.78  Moreover, some choices opened 
75 See generally Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: 
Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy through an Exceptions 
Process, 1984 DUKE L. J. 165 (1984).
76 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION (1993).
77 U.S. movie actress (1892-1980).
78 See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at C1 
(analyzing investor choices among 401(k) plans).
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up by new technologies may create grave moral and political dilemmas, 
as the debates over cloning, late-term abortion, surrogate motherhood, 
and many other issues suggest.  But while we should always bear these 
“dark sides” of more choice in mind, they have little relevance to the 
kinds of enhanced choice I have proposed here.
IV. CONCLUSION
My analysis should make plain why demographic issues like the 
ones discussed in part II (Census categories and ethno-racial profiling)
and the way that governments may seek to address them, are often so 
fraught and difficult to resolve.  The choice of Census classifications
and methodologies is not simply a technocratic exercise.  Instead, 
it raises highly contentious issues not only of individual and group 
identities but also of the appropriate role of government and law 
in defining, signaling, legitimating, and perhaps reinforcing those
identities.  Developing my analysis on the basis of liberal principles 
that underlie, or are congruent with, most conceptions of human 
rights, I have advocated a diversity management strategy that would 
accord greater recognition to individuals’ self-identities, including 
multi-ethnic and multiracial categories.  I have also suggested that 
the government should seriously consider whether the political 
and historical reasons for employing the conventional ethno-racial 
categories have lost enough of their force to justify abandoning them. 
If that day has not yet arrived, it may not be too long before it does. 
By the same token, the conventional categories should have less and 
less value over time for government programs hoping to use them to 
detect instances of illegitimate ethno-racial profiling.  
More generally, I have shown that the task of managing diversity 
in the interests of   advancing human rights and of controlling conflict
within and between groups requires a variety of principled and 
policy judgments.  These judgments, in my view, should emphasize 
the liberal values of government neutrality, group competition, anti-
discrimination, and free and informed choice.
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